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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
cated that where there is evidence of a claimant's bad faith, e. g.,
where it appears that claimant rejected jobs at higher pay which
he was physically able to perform, "actual earnings" would not
be the sole measure of the rate of compensation.
Contribution By Prior Employers
Successive decisions have engrafted to the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law a proviso that where prior compensable injuries
have contributed measurably to ultimate disability, the award
should be apportioned among the prior employers in proportion
to the extent to which the earlier accidents contributed to the
final condition.44 This rule was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals
this term in two cases joined on appeal,4" despite serious prob-
lems of statutory construction.
Claimants Meszaros and Braunstein had suffered prior com-
pensable injuries, and ultimate disability following their latest
injuries was found to have been caused in part by the earlier
accidents. The problem appeared in the fact that their earnings
after the latest accidents were greater than they had been af the
time of the earlier contributing accidents. The court held that
the award should be charged in part against the earlier employ-
ers, despite the fact that their liability might exceed the wages
paid to claimants while they were in the earlier employ.
The New York statute provides:
In no event shall compensation when combined with de-
creased earnings or earning capacity exceed the amount of
wages which the employee was receiving at the time the injury
occurred. 46
The majority observed that the statute referred only to earn-
ings at the time of the latest injury, for which compensation is
now being awarded. Any other result, it was argued, would permit
43. See, e. g., Santo v. Symington Mach. Co., 237 App. Div. 242, 261 ,N. Y. Supp.
706 (3d Dep't 1932).
44. Anderson v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 256 N. Y. 146, 175 N. E. 654 (1931);
Chiodo v. Newhall Co., 254 N. Y. 534, 173 N. E.-854 (1930) ; Zuk v. McGuire Bros., 277
App. Div. 956, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 617 (3d Dep't 1950) ; Thomas v. Royal Dairy, 270 App.
Div. 688, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 276 (3d Dep't 1946).
45. Meszaros v. Goldman, Braunstein v. General Marine Repair, 307 N. Y. 296, 121
N. E. 2d 232 (1954). In the Braunstein case the Appellate Division had affirmed an
award against the latest employer only, on the ground that WORKxmEN's COMPENSATION
LAW § 15 (6) demanded it. 281 App. Div. 1059, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 386 (3d Dep't 1953).
In Meszaros, an award partly against the prior employer was upheld on the theory that
the statute applied only to earnings greater than those obtaining at the time of the latest
accident. 281 App. Div. 1063, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 421 (3d Dep't 1953).
46. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 15 (6).
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a prior employer to escape from contribution merely because a
claimant's wages increased after leaving the former employ.
But the dissenters4 7 strongly contended that:
1. The statute in its terms does not compel apportionment of
the award among employers.4 8
2. None of the decisions which have authorized pro rata di-
vision on the basis of contributory causation prevent a
claimant from recovering the entire award from the latest
employer if earlier employers, for any reason, are unable
to contribute.
3. Even if, as the majority concluded, § 15(6) was drafted
with reference to a single accident involving but one em-
ployer, the reasons for extending it to cover successive
accidents are compelling.
The dissent suggested that the purpose of the enactment of§ 15(6) was to limit an employer's contingent liability, i. e., to
ensure that the employer may not be charged if the reduced earn-
ings after the accident exceed the earnings before the injury oc-
curred; therefore:
it is not less likely to have been the legislative inten-
tion to preclude such a consequence if in after years the
claimant, while working for somebody else in an era when
prevailing wage rates are disproportionate to those existing
when he was in the former employ, sustains an aggravation
of the previous condition while working for another.49
While an award solely against the latest employer appears to
penalize him vis-a-vis prior employers whose earlier accidents are
found to have contributed to the present disability, it is arguable
that this apparent inequity is outweighed by the cogency of the
dissent in the instant case.
XIIL. OTHER CASES
Religious Associations
The Congregational Christian Churches of the United States
and the Evangelical and Reformed Church proposed to unite under
the name of the United Church of Christ. The General Council of
the former organization after a lengthy study, endorsed the union.
Over seventy per cent of its member churches, who voted on the
47. Van Voorhis, J., with Lewis, Ch. J., concurring.
48. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 15 (5), (7).
49. Supra, note 45 at 306, 121 N. E. 2d at 237.
